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Abstract
The dynamic general equilibrium model with hiring costs presented in this paper delivers
involuntary unemployment in the steady state and involuntary uctuations in unemploy-
ment. After calibrating the model, through simulations we are able to show that our model
with labour market imperfections outperforms the standard NK model as for the persis-
tence of responses to monetary shocks. Besides, the model can be easily used to assess
the impact of di¤erent market imperfections on both the steady state and the dynamics
of the economy. We are also able to show how two economies, di¤ering in their degrees
of imperfection, react to policy or non policy shocks: a rigid economy turns out to be
less volatile than a exible economy. Something that reects the actual experience of the
US (exible) and European (rigid) economies.
JEL Classication: E24, E31, E32, E52; J64
Keywords: Hiring Costs, Wage Bargaining, Output Gap, New Keynesian Phillips
Curve, Monetary Policy
1 Introduction and motivation
1.1 The shortcomings of the NK model
Since the late Nineties a standard New Keynesian (NK) dynamic general equilibrium model
has emerged which is widely used as a work-horse for monetary policy. Such a model is
built on microfoundations coming from the Real Business Cycle (RBC) i.e. intertemporal
optimisation of innitely lived, fully rational, consumers and rms. The NK model departs
from the RBC in assuming imperfect competition in the products market and staggered
prices à lá Calvo (1983). As a result of this blend of RBC and Keynesian ingredients a
NK Phillips curve is derived which implies that monetary policy can have relevant e¤ects
on real output, something the RBC model alone cannot deliver1.
However, in our view, the standard NK model has three main shortcomings: 1) there is
no involuntary unemployment, because of the hypothesis of a Walrasian labour market; 2)
there is no trade-o¤between ination and output gap stabilisation; 3) contrary to empirical
evidence, in the model the ination response to shocks is greater than the output response,
whilst output uctuations cannot be as persistent as they appear to be in the real world.
The absence of involuntary unemployment is a serious shortcoming for a model la-
belled as Keynesian, however abridged or reformed. In the standard NK model output
uctuations imply that people vary the hours they work (variation of the intensive mar-
gin) but the number of people employed never changes (that is, there is no variation of
the extensive margin). Such an un-Keynesian feature of the NK model is at odds with
empirical evidence, which does show changes in the number of people working whilst does
not show a labour supply as wage elastic as needed for the adjustment to take place along
the intensive margin alone (Trigari, 2005).
The absence of a trade-o¤ between ination and output stabilisation in the standard
NK model has been christened divine coincidence(Blanchard, Galí, 2005). The divine
coincidence is tightly linked to a specic property of the standard NK model, namely
the fact that the gap between the natural level of output and the e¢ cient (rst best)
level of output is constant and invariant to shocks(Blanchard, Galí, 2005, p. 2). Such a
feature of the standard NK model entails that stabilising the actual output gap (i.e. the
di¤erence between actual and natural output) is equivalent to stabilising the welfare
relevant output gap (i.e. the di¤erence between actual output and rst best output). As
stabilising ination also stabilises the actual output gap, the standard NK model implies
that stabilising ination brings about stabilisation of the welfare relevant output gap: a
divine coincidence indeed. A divine coincidence that makes ination targeting surrounded
by a halo of optimality2.
As for the inability at delivering enough persistence of output uctuations after a
1This earlier literature, described by Goodfriend and King (1997), has often been labelled as New
Neoclassical Synthesis.
2The present theory implies not only that price stability should matter in addition to stability of the
output gap, but also that, at least under certain circumstances, ination stabilization eliminates any need
for further concern with the level of real activity. This is because [...] the time-varying e¢ cient level of
output is the same (up to a constant, which does not a¤ect the basic point) as the level of output that
eliminates any incentive for rms on average to either raise or lower their prices. (Woodford, 2003, p. 13)
1
nominal shock, it may be argued that the presence of nominal rigidities is not able to
overcome the RBC feature of the model, in which forward looking workers and rms are
able to rapidly adjust their hiring and working decisions in a perfectly competitive labour
market. In a Walrasian labour market, uctuations in employment levels are interpreted
as the outcome of voluntary choices and must be accompanied by real wage changes: a
temporary increase in the current wage leads workers to o¤er more labour services in the
current period, in exchange for more leisure in the future. However, a smoother correlation
between wages and employment is frequently observed, and this evidence is at variance
with the theoretical RBC predictions, unless the (real) wage elasticity of labour supply is
implausibly high3.
With a Walrasian labour market, it is di¢ cult to o¤er some plausible rationales for
the insensitive reaction of marginal costs to demand shocks. The missing explanation for
acyclical real wage patterns is at the root of an intrinsic inability of the standard NK
model to reproduce the low sensitivity of real marginal costs to output changes and to
replicate the sluggishness in price setting behavior. Only by assuming a high degree of
nominal inertia - which prevents rms from full price adjustments - one may preserve the
hypothesis of a sensitive marginal cost and still obtain the stickiness in price behaviour
observed in reality. However, microeconomic data on price setting show that the majority
of rms resets their prices more frequently than once a year (see for instance Blinder et al.,
1998, and Carlton, 1986). The e¤ective role of nominal frictions has been raised by Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), by showing that, for a wide range of parameter values of a
specied model with a non-competitive product market, the hypothesis of staggering alone
does not succeed in explaining the size and persistence of observed cyclical uctuations.
1.2 Labour market imperfections and real wage rigidities
Many attempts have recently been made at overcoming the above mentioned shortcomings
of the standard NK model. Not surprisingly, most of these attempts point to some sort
of labour market imperfection4. An early study in this direction (Jeanne, 1998) showed
that the introduction of signicant real rigidities due to a non-competitive labour market
and to an a-cyclical wage dynamics, strengthens nominal rigidities and is compatible with
large-scale cyclical uctuations which persist over time.
In a few recent papers (e.g. Christo¤el Linzert, 2005, Trigari, 2005 and Walsh, 2005),
search frictions are introduced alongside a Mortensen, Pissarides (1994, 1999) matching
function5. In this framework workers and rms bargain over wages and share the positive
rents arising from a successul match. However, this rule makes the wage proportional to
3The empirical evidence reveals a low elasticity of employment to the real wage. See, for instance,
Pencavel (1986).
4Alongside these attempts another strand of research grew aimed at introducing additional rationales
for nominal rigidities: from the sticky information approach, developed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), to the
staggered nominal wage contracts approach, proposed by Christiano, Eichnbaum and Evans (2005), from the
rule of thumb behavior in price or wage setting, advanced by Galì and Gertler (1999) and Rabanal (2001),
to the lagged indexation assumption advanced by Smet and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichnbaum
and Evans (2005).
5Attempts at introducing e¢ ciency wages in a dynamic general equilibrium model have been made by
Felices (2002), Alexopoulos (2004), Danthine and Kurmann (2004).
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productivity changes or to changes in labour market tightness, which means that labour
compensations absorb and lter exogenous shocks. Thus, in case of a positive shock, little
space is left for the opening of new vacancies, while in case of an adverse shock, the low
recruiting e¤ort of employees is still unexplained. This means that the matching model
does not account for the variability of vacancies and does not reproduce the employment
uctuations observed in reality6.
It is only under some stickiness in the real wage, as that obtained by Hall (2005) with
the assumption of a wage norm, that the Mortensen and Pissarides approach gains more
empirical relevance. However, Hall explicitly admits that he does not venture into the
territory of explaining why the economy appears to choose sticky wages from the wide
variety of alternative equilibrium wage patterns (Hall, 2005, 51). In fact the studies
mentioned above combine searching frictions and real wage rigidity in order to obtain a
model economy where plausible output and ination dynamics are obtained.
Blanchard, Galí (2005) bypass the labour market imperfection issue by assuming real
wage stickiness straight away. They are able to show that when real wage stickiness alone
is introduced in an otherwise standard NK model the divine coincidence disappears, as
the gap between natural and e¢ cient output is no longer constant, and is now a¤ected by
shocks(p. 3). As a consequence, stabilising ination is no longer equivalent to stabilising
the welfare relevant output gap and ination targeting is no longer optimal: policy makers
are faced with a trade-o¤ between stabilising ination and stabilising the welfare relevant
output gap.
Both thematching approach and the real wage stickiness approach are far from satisfac-
tory. On the one hand, within the matching approach unemployment qualies as frictional
and voluntary, a notion quite close to the classical unemployment assumption of Arthur
C. Pigou, the author of Theory of Unemployment, a title stigmatised as something of a
misnomer in the General Theory (Keynes, 1936, p. 275)7. On the other hand, the real
wage rigidity is assumed, but not explained (Krause, Lubik, 2003). Even the merger of the
two approaches does not improve the situation: one still obtains only frictional unemploy-
ment and makes use of an unexplained real wage rigidity. A quite embarassing result for
the New Keynesian Economics, a paradigm devoted to providing rigorous microeconomic
foundations for the central elements of Keynesian economicsand thus aimed to pursue
the resurgence of Keynesian economicsitself (Mankiw and Romer, 1991, p. 1).
1.3 The present paper
In the present paper we focus on a labour market imperfection which is capable to de-
liver, at once, involuntary unemployment, the end of the divine coincidence and persistent
output and employment uctuations after a shock. Drawing from Howitt (1988) we shall
assume that current employment decisions are only partially reversible over time, because
6For instance, in the U.S., as argued in Shimer (2005), the standard deviation of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is almost 20 times as large as the standard deviation of productivity, while the search
model predicts the same volatility. Analogous evidence is observed by Hall (2005) in case of demand
shocks, thus proving that recessions are times when the labor markets of all industries slacken - not times
when workers moves from industry with slack markets to other with tight markets(Hall, 2005, p. 52).
7This has been recalled in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p. 426), who give in the Appendix of their
article a brief review of some historyof the matching function, thus recalling the intuition of Pigou.
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of searching and recruiting costs faced by rms. We shall also remove changes in working
hours by assumption in order to focus on the e¤ects of uctuations on employment. More
comfortable results than those obtained by the standard NK model are reached without
unexplained real wage rigidities, at the same time keeping the analytical complexity of the
model at a minimum, unattainable by models based on labour search and matching.
The model presented in this paper delivers involuntary unemployment in the steady
state and involuntary uctuations in unemployment. After calibrating the model, through
simulations we are able to show that our model with labour market imperfections out-
performs the standard NK model as for the persistence of responses to monetary shocks.
Besides, the model can be easily used to assess the impact of di¤erent market imperfections
on both the steady state and the dynamics of the economy. Thanks to its simplicity, our
model can be employed to show how two economies - di¤ering in their degrees of labour
and/or goods markets imperfection - react to policy or non policy shocks: cyclical output
uctuations tend to be smaller in a rigid economy than in a exible economy, whilst ina-
tion volatility is higher in rigid economies than in exible economies. These ndings seem
to mimic well the actual experience of the US and European economies, the US being
more exible and displaying more volatile output levels and Europe being more rigid and
displaying less volatile output levels (but more volatile ination).
While we were working on our paper, Blanchard and Galí (2006) implemented a similar
idea, i.e the introduction of labour market frictions à la Howitt in a standard NK
model. Although their starting point is similar to ours, their paper goes in a di¤erent
direction. There are three main di¤erences between the present paper and Blanchard and
Galí (2006). First and most importantly, the focus of the two papers is di¤erent: the
objective of Blanchard and Galí (2006) is the derivation of an optimal monetary policy;
ours is to develop a simple framework that allows the analysis of the interactions between
nominal rigidities and labour market imperfections/institutions. Second, Blanchard and
Galí (2006) need a very specic parametrisation (though not unrealistic) in order to obtain
some of their results. Our model, in some sense, is both more general and simpler8.
Third, their model integrates both hiring costs and an exogenous real wage rigidity à
la Hall (2005). In our model, we just introduce hiring costs, while some degree of real
wage rigidity is obtained endogenously. Our framework is therefore more parsimonius and
permits to better evaluate the independent impact of labour market imperfections on a
stylised economy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the most controversial aspects
of the standard NK model are sketched out for future reference. Section 3 is devoted to
the building blocks of the model with hiring costs, i.e. the (by now standard) derivation of
a new IS curve from utility maximisation (3.1) and that of hiring, pricing and employment
8Blanchard and Galí build their paper under a particular parametrisation that leads to e¢ cient and
natural levels of output that are invariant to productivity shocks, i.e. constant if other shocks are absent.
Two assumptions are key to obtain this result: a utility function that is log in consumption, and hiring
costs that increase proportionally with productivity. These assumptions, among other things, ensure that,
if real wage rigidities are absent, the divine coincidence continues to hold. It can be shown that this would
not be true under a more general parametrisation. Our paper is more general in the sense that we do not
need to impose these restrictions in order to get our results.
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decisions (3.2). The model di¤ers from a standard NK model in two key elements: a) the
introduction of hiring costs and of an exogenous separation rate in the labour market; b)
the wage determination mechanism - workers and rms bargain over wages and share the
positive surplus arising from a successful hiring. These two elements fundamentally change
the dynamics of marginal costs and the price-setting behaviour of rms. Interestingly, the
model permits to characterise the long-run equilibrium unemployment in terms of the
institutional parameters determining the structure of the goods and labour markets
(subsection 3.3). Subsection 3.4 shows that in an economy with hiring costs even in the
absence of exogenous real wage rigidities, the gap between the rst best and the second
best level of output is not constant but it is a variable responding to shocks.
In section 4 the dynamics of an economy with hiring costs and price staggering is
studied. Under Calvo pricing a New Keynesian Phillips curve is derived (4.1). It is shown
that ination at time t depends on expected ination, a distributed lag of welfare relevant
output gaps, the expected output gap and on the productivity and wage shocks. As
a consequence the divine coincidence does not hold. A non trivial trade-o¤ between
output and ination stabilisation emerges. After a brief discussion of the characteristics of
the monetary policy rule (4.2), subsection 4.3 presents the simple three equations reduced
form of our model, which consists of an IS equation, a Phillips curve and a Taylor monetary
policy rule. In section 5 the model is calibrated making use of plausible parameter values
- when possible drawn from the relevant literature. Section 6 presents a selection of the
simulations runned, which help showing how the model advanced in the present paper is
able to overcome the main shortcomings of the standard NK model and allows a relatively
simple analysis of the impact of di¤ering degrees of market imperfections on the dynamic
behaviour of the economy. Moreover the simulations pursued throw some new light on an
old puzzle, showing that the more rigid is the economy the less volatile is its output after
any shock. Section 7 briey concludes.
2 Highlights of the standard NK model
The standard NK models integrate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities into a
dynamic general equilibrium framework largely associated with the RBC paradigm (Galí
2002). In particular, the NK model inherits from the RBC literature a neoclassical labour
market. This fact leads, in our view, to some of the weaknesses of this model.
In a standard NK model, the utility function depends on consumption and on hours
worked:
U(Ct; Nt) =
(Ct)
1 
1     
(Nt)
1+
1 + 
(1)
Utility maximization leads to a standard labour supply equation where the real wage equals
the marginal rate of substitution: WtPt = 
Nt
C t
. On the supply side, rms choose prices
taking into consideration the marginal costs dynamics, which simply reect movements
in real wages and productivity:
MCt =
Wt
AtPt
= 
Nt
AtC
 
t
(2)
This specication of the labour market is at the heart of some of the criticism around
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the NK model. First, as the labour supply turns out to be binding in equilibrium, the
model is unable to explain involuntary unemployment. Secondly, in the standard NK
model a meaningful policy trade-o¤ between output and ination stabilisation is absent.
To see this, consider the New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
t = Ett+1 + xt (3)
where t is ination and xt is the output gap. Iterating forward, one can express the
current ination rate in terms of current and future output gaps:
t = 
1X
s=0
sEt fxt+sg (4)
Using (3), it is easy to show that a pure ination targeting strategy, i.e. a strategy
where t = 0 at all t, completely stabilises the output gap, i.e. xt = 0 at all t. Viceversa,
a strategy that stabilises the output gap in each period, setting xt = 0 at all t, com-
pletely stabilises ination (t = 0 at all t). Hence the monetary authority does not face
a policy trade-o¤ between output and ination stabilisation: this is the essence of divine
coincidence(Blanchard Galí, 2005). Such a divine coincidence is seen as unsatisfactory
by many researcher and central bankers. In the following sections we shall argue that,
even without imposing explicitly some form of real wage rigidity, the divine coincidence
disappears as soon as a more realistic structure for the labour market is introduced.
3 Flexible price equilibrium
This section presents a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with labour
and product market imperfections. There are three groups of agents: households, rms
and a monetary authority. Households maximise lifetime utility derived from consumption
of a composite good and from money holdings; furthermore, each agent, as long as wages
are above the level of home production b, inelastically supplies one unit of labour. Monop-
olistically competitive rms maximise prots by choosing prices and employment levels,
under the constraint of hiring costs and facing an exogenous separation rate. Workers
and employers bargain over wages: the two parties share the positive surplus arising from
a successful hiring. Under fully exible prices and wages the central banks only role is
xing the ination rate.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of households on the unit interval, and each representative household
purchases a composite consumption good C, holds money M and supplies labour. Each
unit supplies one unit of labour, provided the real wage is at least equal to the value of home
production b, with the labour force normalised to 1. This assumption - by entirely freezing
the intertemporal substitution mechanism emphasised by the RBC - greatly simplies
the dynamic analysis and is well suited to our focus on changes in employment along
the extensive margin9. The utility function is separable in consumption and real money
balances
M
P
.
9The same assumption is made in Walsh (2005).
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At date t the representative household j maximises its lifetime utility.
E0
1X
t=0
t

U j(Ct); V
j

M
P

(5)
As in other similar models, where the monetary policy is represented by an interest rate
rule, it is not necessary to specify the functional form V j
 
M
P

, because the unique role of
this function is in determining the monetary stock which is necessary to clear the money
market10.
Under the hypothesis of a Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function and by
omitting the superscript j, one gets:
Et
1X
t=0
t
C1 t
1   (6)
where  is the subjective discount factor and  is the constant relative risk aversion degree.
The decision is subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by the following:
Ct +
(Mt  Mt 1 +Bt  Bt 1)
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
Nt + it 1
Bt 1
Pt
+ but +t   Tt (7)
This shows that consumption and savings (the expression in brackets) are nanced by
income accruing from labour services

Wt
Pt
Nt

, by income of unemployed members (but),
by the share of prots t (net of transfers from the government Tt), and by returns
it 1
Bt 1
Pt

from one-period nancial assets acquired at time t  1.
It must be noticed that Wt and b denote, respectively the wage rate and the current
value of home production received, respectively, by Nt and ut, the family members em-
ployed or unemployed. The representative household hypothesis leads to assume that the
fraction of employed or unemployed members is the same across families; moreover, if each
household pools the di¤erent income sources before choosing per capita consumption, a
perfect insurance emerges and it permits to avoid distributional issues.
Following Dixit-Stiglitz (1977), the composite consumption good Ct consists of the
di¤erentiated products of the monopolistically competitive rms:
Ct =
Z t
0
 
Cit
  1
 di
 
 1
(8)
where the parameter  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution of the demand for individual
goods and Cit is the good produced by the i-th rm. The aggregate price index Pt is given
by
Pt =
Z t
0
 
pit
1 
di
 1
1 
10This functional form will not be considered in the following analysis (see for an analogous approach
Walsh, 2005).
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One thus obtains the households demand for good i, simply denoted as Cit :
Cit =

pit
Pt
 
Ct (9)
Solving the intertemporal optimisation problem one gets the following rst order condition:
C t = (1 + it)Et

C t+1
Pt
Pt+1

(10)
Log-linearising equation (10) around the steady state, one gets the new IS curve (McCal-
lum and Nelson, 1999):
c^t = Etc^t+1   1

(^{t   Et^t+1) (11)
where variables with hat denote log-deviations from steady state and t = log PtPt 1 is the
ination rate at time t: In the model economy the intertemporal substitution elasticity is
constant and is given by the reciprocal of the relative risk aversion degree :
3.2 Firms and the labour market
3.2.1 Hiring decisions
The economy has a continuum of rms, each producing a di¤erentiated good with an
identical technology:
Y it = AtN
i
t (12)
where productivity At follows an AR(1)process.
In such a model, employment dynamics can be dened by assuming a separation rate
equal to , where  2 (0; 1), and on the basis of an optimum hiring rate equal to ht,
endogenously determined as the outcome of optimal choices by the individual rm. The
separation rate , which is a measure of the probability of job termination, is simply
considered as an exogenous parameter in the majority of contributions, even if some studies
have tried to provide some endogenous determination (see Trigari, 2005). We shall assume
that  is, to some extent, under control of the policy maker who can impose restrictions on
rings as an attempt to inuence jobs destructions and thus unemployment levels. Thus,
in some sense,  measures the inverse of the degree of labour protection.
The evolution of employment at rm i is determined by the following:
N it = (1  )N it 1 + hit (13)
At the aggregate level, employment Nt 
R 1
0 N
i
tdi evolves according to the following:
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 +Ht (14)
Where Ht 
R 1
0 h
i
tdi denotes the aggregate hiring level.
We denote by Ut the pool of jobless individuals who are available for new jobs. Since
labour is inelastically supplied and the labour force is normalised to 1, Ut is dened as
follows:
Ut = 1  (1  )Nt 1 (15)
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After hiring decisions are undertaken, unemployment is dened as ut = 1 Nt.
The optimal hiring decisions are adopted under the hypothesis, suggested in Howitt
(1988), that rms face a cost of searching and recruiting new workers. Hiring costs for
rm i are given as follows:
	t =
GHt
Ut
hit (16)
where G is a scaling parameter that may be inuenced by matching and turnover costs.
Firms may bear advertising, screening, and training costs and may incur in ring costs
when protection legislation imposes legal restrictions. In this context, search and labour
market frictions, explored along the lines suggested by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
are accompanied by turnover costs.
Furthermore, the marginal cost of hiring is increasing in the aggregate level of hiring
Ht: this captures the idea that a high rate of hiring may force rms to increase their search
intensity. It means that with an increase in employment due to hiring (Ht) a conges-
tione¤ect occurs: the recruitment process becomes more di¢ cult and the matching less
favourable. Viceversa, with an increase in Ut, it is easier for the rm to recruit workers,
and the matching between the skills required by the rm and those o¤ered by the available
work force improves.
We assume that matches are provided (without bearing any cost) by a specialised rm
endowed with superior information. Hence 	t is a cost for production units and a pure
rent for the specialised rm. Such a rent enters aggregate prots and is spent according
to (9). As a consequence we can write Cit = Y
i
t and Ct = Yt. In the following sections we
shall assume that the government is able to a¤ect the level of this rent, and by so doing
the degree of labour market imperfection.
3.2.2 Price determination
Each rm operates in a product market featuring monopolistic competition under the con-
straint given by the demand function. Each rms optimal price is chosen by maximising
real prots, given the prices set by other rms:
Max
pit
Et
1X
s=0
Qt;t+s

pit+sY
i
t+s   Pt+s
GHt+s
Ut+s
hit+s  Wt+sN it+s

(17)
where Qt;t+s = s
C t+s
C t
Pt
Pt+s
is the relevant stochastic discount factor for nominal payo¤s.
The demand function that constrains the maximisation problem can be written as:
Y it =

pit
Pt
 
Yt (18)
The optimal price setting rule for rm i, obtained by taking into account the production
function and the employment evolution equation, is:
pit
Pt
=  fMCtg (19)
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where the term  =  1 is the mark up.
With exible prices, in a symmetric equilibrium, all rms will charge the same price
(pit = Pt). This implies that the real marginal cost will be constant and equal to the
inverse of the markup:
MCt =
  1

=
1

(20)
The current expected value of the marginal cost MCt will be a¤ected by the presence of
hiring costs as follows:
MCt =
1
At
Wt
Pt
+
GHt
AtUt
  (1  )Et

Ct
Ct+1
GHt+1
AtUt+1

(21)
By inspection of (21) one can see that hiring new workers at time t has two e¤ects: i) it
increases the recruitment costs at time t - an e¤ect represented by the term
GHt
AtUt
; ii) it
reduces the costs of hiring new workers in period t + 1, since higher levels of recruiting
e¤orts undertaken in the rst period decrease the needs for rms to hire in the following
period. The second e¤ect is captured by the term  (1   )Et

Ct
Ct+1
GHt+1
AtUt+1

. In our
model the presence of hiring costs creates a wedge between the real wage and the marginal
cost relevant for the rm, which in turn are essential to explain ination dynamics. Such
a wedge leads the cyclical behaviour of marginal costs in a model with labour market
imperfections to substantially deviate from that of real wages (compare 21 with 2). As
Krause and Lubik (2005, p. 11) notice, hiring frictions generate a surplus for existing
matches which give rise to long-term employment relationships. These, in turn, reduce
the allocative role of current real wages. As a consequence, the e¤ective real marginal cost
can change even if the wage does not change.
3.2.3 Wage Determination
The present wage WRt is determined by a component W
Nash
t , set in a bargaining process,
and by "t, which is an exogenous wage shock, assumed to be 1 in steady state. This last
term captures the role of institutional factors that may lead to a temporary departure
from the Nash wage rule:
WRt =W
Nash
t "t (22)
The negotiated wage is the outcome of a bargaining process that maximises the weighted
product of the partiessurpluses from hiring and employment. One can assume the fol-
lowing Nash bargaining problem:
max
W = (V
E
t   V Ut )sS(1 s)t
where V Et is the value a worker associates with being employed, and where V
U
t is the value
a worker assignes to be unemployed, with V Et and V
U
t expressed in consumption units.
The process is conditioned by the workers and rms bargaining powers (respectively
s and 1   s), and gives rise to a distribution of the joint surplus from an established
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relationship: Firms and workers obtain from the match a return which is lost if they
separate, since in this case they have to undertake a search activity and bear additional
recruiting costs. The rm will hire up to the value that equals the marginal benets
and marginal costs from hiring; it follows that the rms (marginal) surplus from a given
relationship is simply given by its unit hiring cost:
St =
GHt
Ut
(23)
The marginal value of an employment relationship V Et depends not only on the bargained
wage WNasht , but also on the probability that the worker will remain employed in the
following period. In period t + 1 he will have a likelihood to be employed equal to
[(1   ) + (Ht+1Ut+1 )], where the rst term in squared brackets captures the chance to hold
the present job, while the second term is the probability to be hired in the subsequent
period, conditional on the probability that separation takes place in the present period. It
must be noticed that Ht+1Ut+1 , which is a measure of tightness of the labour market, represents
for each individual unemployed the probability of nding a job in period t+ 1.
In both situations the worker will get a value V Et+1. Moreover, the worker faces a
probability equal to (1   Ht+1Ut+1 ) to be red and to remain unemployed in the following
period. In this case he will obtain a value V Ut+1.
The subjective evaluation, given in terms of utility obtained from consumption, is
therefore given by:
V Et =W
Nash
t + Et
(
Ct+1
Ct
  
1  

1  Ht+1
Ut+1

V Et+1 + 

1  Ht+1
Ut+1

V Ut+1
)
(24)
The value for a worker of being unemployed is dependent on the current value b (that
is the current value assigned to home production) and the likelihood of being employed
Ht+1
Ut+1
or unemployed (1   Ht+1Ut+1 ) in the following period. In those two di¤erent scenarios
the worker will obtain the di¤erent values V Et+1or V
U
t+1:
V Ut = b+ Et
(
Ct+1
Ct
  Ht+1
Ut+1
V Et+1 +

1  Ht+1
Ut+1

V Ut+1
)
(25)
Combining both conditions we obtain the net value of being employed:
V Et   V Ut =WNasht   b+ (1  )Et
(
Ct+1
Ct
  
1  Ht+1
Ut+1

(V Et+1   V Ut+1)
)
Letting  denote the workers relative bargaining power [  (s=(1 s))], the Nash solution
gives:
V Et   V Ut = St (26)
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Imposing this condition into the expression for the householdssurplus, we get the Nash
wage schedule:
WNasht = b+ St   (1  )Et
(
Ct+1
Ct
  
1  Ht+1
Ut+1

St+1
)
which in steady state yields:
WNash = b+ S

1  (1  )

1  H
U

(27)
3.3 The long run equilibrium
Taking into account the denition of St and substituting the wage schedule into the equi-
librium condition (20), one obtains:
1

=
b"t
At
+ (1 + "t)
St
At
  (1  )Et

Ct
Ct+1
St+1
At

1 + "t

1  Ht+1
Ut+1

(28)
This condition determines the equilibrium level of hiring, employment and unemployment.
In our model economy, the steady state equilibrium may be ine¢ cient for several
reasons. Firstly, the presence of a xed cost of hiring, equal to G, constitutes a departure
from the competitive paradigm. Even if there are no severance costs, those rms that
intend to reduce their labour demand in the following periods bear the cost of previous
labour employment, which reveals as a sunk cost.
Secondly, two di¤erent externalities are at work to produce sub-optimal results. There
is a thick market externality, an external economy of scale as that present in the Diamond
trade model: each single unemployed worker faces a higher job nding rate, the higher is
the recruiting e¤ort of employees. There is also a thin market externality at work: each
rm does not internalise the impacts of increased hiring in terms of lower unemployment
levels and their negative feedbacks on higher recruiting costs. Therefore the individual
rm fails to take into account the e¤ect of its current recruiting activities in depleting the
stock of unemployed workers and hence in raising future costs of hiring(Howitt, 1988, p.
157).
Furthermore, the two mentioned externalities may interact with other distortions aris-
ing from wage bargaining. The presence of searching and turnover costs is the premise
for economic rents and bargaining: workers and employers negotiate over wages and thus
split the marginal surplus accruing from a successful hiring decision. In this context, each
single rm is unable to capture all the rents generated by a successful matching, and the
individual marginal hiring decision is set at a suboptimal level.
In our economy, each unemployed worker is involuntarily unemployed and a structural
Keynesian unemployment emerges. As Howitt suggests the model exhibits persistent
involuntary unemployment, even though expectations are rational, no nominal wage or
price rigidity exists, and no privately attainable gains from trade are left unexploited
(Howitt, 1988, p. 148). Compared to the basic standard NK framework, the long run
equilibrium employment obtained in our economy is a¤ected by additional imperfections,
as the following analysis shows.
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We denote the long run job nding rate, i.e. the steady state ratio of new hired workers
over searching individuals, as z = HU . The value of z is implicitly determined as a solution
of the equilibrium condition (28). It can be shown that11:
z =
 f(1 + ) (1   (1  ))g
2 (1  )  +   (29)
where:
  =
vuut  1   bA
 (1  ) GA
+
f(1 + ) (1   (1  ))g
2 (1  ) 
2
Once z is known, the steady state employment rate is determined by solving the following:
N =
z
 + (1  )z (30)
The results obtained so far allow us to evaluate the impact of di¤erent imperfections
and labour market institutions on the steady state level of employment, as shown by the
following partial derivatives, where 0  (1  (1  )).
@N
@G =   A b0G22   ((1 z)+z)2 < 0
@N
@ =   A0G2 2  ((1 z)+z)2 < 0
@N
@b =   10G2   ((1 z)+z)2 < 0
@N
@ =

+ 1 
0
202   12 

(1 0)2(1+)
2023 +
A(  b
A
+ 1
m
)
02G

 
((1 z)+z)2
@N
@ =
"
  1+
2(1 )2 +
1
2 
 
(1 0)(1+)2
202(1 )2 +
A

1

  b
A

0(1 )G
!#
 
((1 z)+z)2
It is easy to check the role of di¤erent imperfections in lowering the equilibrium em-
ployment level N . Some of them, as b and , increase the value of the threat pointand
the workers bargaining power; they thus exert an indirect negative e¤ect on labour de-
mand, as a consequence of higher values of the Nash-bargained wage. On the other hand,
the hiring cost G exerts a direct impact since it is conducive to a lower intention to open
11The steady state equilibrium condition can be written as:
1

=
b
A
+
S
A

(1 + )  (1  )

1 + 

1  H
U

Solving for z = H
U
, one can get:
(1  )G
A
(z)2 +
G
A
f(1 + ) (1  (1  ))g z  

1

  b
A

= 0
i.e. an equation of the form
z2 + z    = 0
Notice that this is a second order equation in z; it will in general have two solutions, one positive and
one negative. To consider the economically meaningful solution, we will consider only the positive root,
which leads to (29).
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Figure 1: The impact of varying degrees of imperfection on the long run equilibrium em-
ployment
vacancies and to undertake recruiting e¤orts. An increase in the rms monopoly power
() which, as well known, shifts downward the labour demand curve, reduces the number
of workers that rms are willing to hire for any given bargained wage. For values of the
parameters in the acceptability range it can be shown that generally both an increase in
 (i.e. the relative bargaining power of workers) and an increase in the separation rate ,
reduce the equilibrium level of employment, as shown in Figure 112.
These results can also be used to show the interesting interactions between di¤erent
imperfections and institutions. Here we explore just one such interaction. The following
Table shows that a lower ability of a rm to capture the rents generated by successful
hiring decisions (i.e. a higher value of ) amplies the negative impact of hiring costs
(G) on employment. In other words, the combined e¤ects of a higher workersbargaining
12 It must be recalled that in our model economy, where the inows into employment are obstacled
by hiring costs, the outows from employment due to the destruction of jobs cause an increase of the
unemployment rate. In this scenario, an increasing labour protection seems to have a positive impact on the
equilibrium level of employment, as it preserves the job tenure of incumbent employees. However, a lower
employment protection and therefore a higher , should exert some positive e¤ect on employment, since it
should induce a higher incentive to open vacancies or should be accompanied by a parallel contraction of
hiring cost G. The exploration of this potential impact, that cannot be captured in our model, as well as
in the standard New Keynesian Model, calls for additional research.
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power () and of a greater level of hiring costs (G) produce a reinforced negative impact
on employment:
@N
@G 
 0:224 0:1
 0:290 0:3
 0:335 0:5
 0:365 0:7
 0:398 0:9
3.4 The welfare-relevant output gap
It is possible to compare the steady state value of the long run natural equilibrium
obtained in our model economy with a benchmark solution, represented by a welfare
relevant concept, i.e the rst best solution.
Let N denotes the rst best outcome and N the natural outcome of our model
economy. The steady state rst best level of employment is simply given by the full
employment condition13:
N = 1 (31)
The steady state naturalsolution is obtained by solving the equilibrium condition (28)
for the steady state. Thus imposing "t = 1, At = A, as seen before, one gets the
employment solution (30), here reported for an easier comparison:
N =
z
 + (1  )z
The crucial question now is whether the distance between the actual level of output and
the rst best level of output is a constant or is it a variable responding to shocks. The
question has been raised by Blanchard and Galí (2005) in an inuential recent paper,
where the authors show that in the standard NK model the distance between the e¢ cient
level of output and the natural level of output (i.e. the one that would prevail if prices
were exible) is constant. They also show how under real wage rigidity this property
disappears.
In this section we show how in our model, even in the absence of exogenous real
wage rigidities, the gap between the rst best and the second best level of output is not
constant but it is a variable responding to shocks. To explore this issue, the rst step is
the determination of the natural level of output, which can be obtained by maintaining
the assumption of full exibility of nominal variables. The short run equilibrium, which
13Blanchard-Galí (2006) consider as the benchmark solution the constrained e¢ cient allocation. Im-
plicitely, they assume that the social planner cannot eliminate the frictions in the labour market. In the
present work, we consider hiring costs as labour market imperfections that, at least to a certain extent,
can be alleviated by appropriate policies. This choice, in our view, is more appropriate to describe Eu-
ropean unemployment. Notice however that the results of this paper are attainable also if one takes the
constrained e¢ cient allocation as a reference point.
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can be a¤ected by the exogenous shocks, can be derived by the log-linearization of the
marginal costs; this permits to obtain:
1

cmct = W
A
n
w^Nasht + "^t
o
+
S
A
fs^tg   (1  )S
A
Et f (c^t   c^t+1) + s^t+1g   1

a^t (32)
where S =
GH
U
is the hiring costs value of steady state and s^t = h^t  u^t. In the following
we assume the steady state level of productivity A = 1.
Log-linearising the Nash wage rule, it is possible to obtain:
Ww^Nasht = Ss^t   (1  )S

1  H
U

Et
(
 (c^t   c^t+1) +
 
1 
H
U
1  HU
!
s^t+1
)
(33)
Using these two expressions, after some algebra, we can rewrite the marginal cost as
follows:
1

cmct = F1n^t   F2n^t 1   F3Etn^t+1   F4a^t +W"^t (34)
where:
F1= (1 + )Sb0 + (1  )S
 
1 + H 0

(b1   )  H
U
b1

(35)
F2=S (1 + ) b1 (36)
F3= (1  )S
 
1 + H 0

(b0   )  H
U
b0

(37)
F4=
1

+ (1  )S  1 + H 0 (1  a) (38)
b0=
1

(39)
b1=
(1  )

H 0 (40)
H 0=

1  H
U

(41)
Since under the symmetrical equilibrium condition (20) one has
1

= MCt and the mark
up  is a constant, the log-deviations of the marginal cost must be cmct = 0. From the
(34) the natural employment (associated to the natural output) evolves according to the
following:
F1n^t = F2n^t 1 + F3Etn^t+1 + F4a^t  W"^t (42)
from which it can be seen that time t natural employment thus depends on employment
at time t  1, on the expectations of employment at time t+1, on the productivity shock
and on the wage shock.
To nally evaluate whether the distance between the natural (second best) employment
n^t and the rst best is constant, it is su¢ cient to compare (42) with the corresponding
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e¢ cient employment, which is simply n^t = 0 (remember that employment is constant
at the full employment level under the rst best). Equation (42) immediately shows
that aggregate shocks cause an endogenous dynamic in the welfare relevant output gap:
when productivity shocks a^t and wage shocks "^t hit the economy, the natural employment
equilibrium changes and thus the gap with respect to the rst best (n^t = 0) changes14.
4 Sticky prices
The further question is to examine the welfare-relevant output gap in a model a¤ected by
price stickiness. In this context, where nominal rigidities give rise to non neutral e¤ects
of monetary policy, a new policy designproblem arises.
The non neutrality of nominal shocks may be obtained by introducing nominal inertia,
as shown in the basic sticky price model widely adopted in the New Keynesian Economics.
In this section, this basic framework is reformulated to take into account the presence of
hiring costs. An additional inertia in the interest rate adjustment qualies the Taylor rule,
which is assumed to be the monetary policy rule adopted by the central bank.
4.1 Calvo pricing and the New Keynesian Phillips curve
Let us now assume the staggered price setting model proposed by Calvo (1983). In each
period t, a fraction (1   ) of rms (randomly selected) reset their optimal price, while
the remaining fraction  keeps it unchanged. The optimal price for an adjusting rm is
set so as to maximise the discounted sum of current and expected future prots. It can
be shown that the following condition is obtained15:
Et
1X
s=0
sQt;t+sYt+s=t

~Pt   
  1Pt+sMCt+s

= 0 (43)
where, as seen before, Qt;t+s is the discount factor with which agents value prots obtained
at date t+ s, while ~Pt denotes the optimal price chosen in period t and Yt+s=t is the future
level of output in period t+ s for a rm re-setting prices at time t. The real marginal cost
is as in (21) above:
MCt =
1
At
Wt
Pt
+
GHt
AtUt
  (1  )Et

Ct
Ct+1
GHt+1
AtUt+1

(44)
14 Interestingly, this result contrasts - at least at a rst sight - with the nding of Blanchard-Galí (2006).
In their paper, in fact, the divine coincidence still holds after the introduction of hiring costs. They
thus need to assume real wage rigidities to create a non-trivial policy trade-o¤. In our model, instead, the
introduction of hiring costs does introduce such a trade-o¤. What can explain this apparent inconsistency?
The answer is simple, and lies in the fact that Blanchard-Galí (2006) focus on a particular, very convenient
parametrisation. Specically, they assume that the utility function is log in consumption and that hiring
costs increase proportionally with productivity. These two assumptions imply that the rst best and the
second best level of output are constant and invariant to productivity shocks. As both are constant, the
distance among the two is also constant and the divine coincidence continues to hold. As soon as one
deviates from these two assumptions, the rst best and the second best level of output will vary with
shocks and, more importantly, they will not evolve in the same way: the divine coincidence disappears.
Intuitively, the main reason why the rst best and the second best level of output will have di¤erent
dynamics lies in the presence of the two mentioned externalities in the hiring process (the rst entering
through aggregate hirings Ht and the second through unemployment Ut).
15See Blanchard-Galì (2006) for a detailed discussion of the derivation in a similar setting.
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In our model, hiring costs a¤ect prots and therefore pricing decisions. Furthermore,
since the lagged values of employment inuence the present level of hiring and therefore
recruiting costs, one should have that prots are conditioned by past employment decisions.
However, it must be noticed that it is the marginal value of hirings (GHtUt ) that matters and
that in the specication for hiring costs adopted (16) such a marginal value is independent
of the individual hiring level hit. One can thus obtain again the standard result that
lagged values do not exert any inuence on current choices, and each optimising rm
chooses the same strategy since the pricing history does not a¤ect the individual choice.
This allows one to aggregate prices and to obtain, as in the standard Calvo model, the
index Pt =

(1  )(P t )1  + (Pt 1)1 
 1
1  .
Log-linearising around a zero ination steady state the optimal price setting rule and
the price index equation one can get the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
^t = Et f^t+1g+ cmct (45)
Where cmct represents the log deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state value
and  = (1  )(1  )=.
Apparently the Phillips curve in (45) is identical to the standard NK Phillips curve.
However, the term cmct is now inuenced by the presence of hiring costs. Equation (32)
leads to rewrite the NKPC (45) in terms of employment as follows:
^t = Et f^t+1g+ 

F1bnt   F2bnt 1   F3Etbnt+1   F4a^t +W"^t	 (46)
where the upper bar denotes the solutions for the real variables in a sticky price equilib-
rium. Expression (46) can be written in terms of the welfare relevant output gap. By
denoting x^t the welfare relevant output gap and recalling that in our model the output
gap is equal to the employment gap, x^t = byt   yt = bnt, one has 16:
^t = Et f^t+1g+  fF1x^t   F2x^t 1   F3Etx^t+1   F4a^t +W"^tg (47)
Interestingly, equation (47) implies that the divine coincidencedoes not hold, and this
result is obtained without introducing any unexplained real wage rigidity. Ination at
time t depends on expected ination, a distributed lag of welfare relevant output gaps, the
expected output gap and on the productivity and wage shocks. This implies that there is
no way to stabilise at once ination and the welfare relevant output gap. A new policy
trade o¤ arises which is absent in the standard NK model.
Consider at rst a pure ination targetingstrategy, i.e. a strategy aimed at stabil-
ising ination at all horizons (^t = 0 for all t). From (47) it follows that the output gap
evolves according to the following:
F1x^t = F2x^t 1 + F3Etx^t+1 + F4a^t  W"^t (48)
Thus, we see that a pure ination targeting strategy is unable to stabilise the output gap
in face of productivity or wage shocks: output deviations from the benchmark will be
16More precisely, as the actual steady state level of output di¤ers from the rst best one, the output gap
x^t denotes the percentage change in the distance between actual output and the rst best.
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large and display a high degree of inertia. Notice that under the pure ination targeting
strategy, rms have no incentive to change their prices17; accordingly, the dynamics of the
output gap replicate exactly the dynamics under exible prices, as can easily be seen by
comparing (48) with (42).
Secondly, consider a pure output targetingpolicy, a strategy aimed at stabilising the
output gap in each period, i.e. bnt = 0 and x^t = 0 for all t. Iterating forward (45), one
gets:
^t= 
1X
s=0
sEt fcmct+sg
^t= 
1X
s=0
sEt fF1x^t+s   F2x^t+s 1   F3Etx^t+s+1   F4a^t+s +W"^t+sg
= 
1X
s=0
s fWEt"^t+s   F4Eta^t+sg
A Pure Output Targeting strategy is thus unable to stabilise ination. Therefore,
adverse realisations of wage or productivity shocks necessarily lead to a rise in ination
and/or a negative output gap. The presence of hiring costs, by a¤ecting the distance
between the rst best and the natural level of output, creates a non trivial trade-o¤
between output and ination stabilisation. This calls into question the role of the monetary
authority.
4.2 The monetary policy rule
The specic rule for the monetary policy proposed by Taylor (1993), expresses a direct
relationship between the interest rate and two target variables, ination and output gap.
The appropriate denition of these two variables and their assigned relative weights reect
central banks preferences18. These choices should be implemented to o¤set distorsions
that may exists in the economy (Galí, 2002). However, when some model uncertainty is
present, for instance when the central bank knows the distribution of some parameters of
the model economy but does not know their actual realisations, some caution in policy
responses may be desirable (Clarida, Galí, Gertler, 1999). This implies the adoption of an
optimal rule, under some constraints on the volatility of the interest rate. The sluggishness
17See e.g. Galí (2002) for a discussion of this point.
18 In a class of models where individual preferences are expressed in terms of consumption and leisure,
and where each family elastically supplies his labour services, the choice of the optimal policy rule may
be undertaken adopting a welfare criterium as the expected utility of the representative household. This
welfare approach has been suggested by Woodford (2003, ch. 6); the author derives a quadratic loss policy
function that represents a quadratic (second-order Taylor series) approximation to the level of expected
utility of the single household. This utility-based welfare approach is however not attainable in our model
economy, as in Walsh (2005), where each family inelastically supplies a xed amount of labour. It must be
recalled that other issues, as the possibility of hybridtargeting rules and discretionary policies or the role
of imperfect knowledge may condition the actual choice of central banks. A wide excursus of the several
themes and critical perspectives related to targeting policy rules is o¤ered by the group of contributions
collected in Bernanke, Woodford (2005).
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in the policy reaction function, which provides a more realistic picture of the historical
patterns of interest rates, may be captured by the following rule:
(1 + it) = 
1 m(1 + it 1)mEt(t+1)(1 m)(xt)x(1 m)e"
m
t (49)
Log-linearising it around the steady state, one can get:
{^t = it    = m{^t 1 +  (1  m)Et(^t+1) + x (1  m) x^t + "mt (50)
The interest rate smoothingis captured by m, the coe¢ cient associated with the lagged
value of the interest rate: the higher is m, the more partial is the adjustment of the policy
instrument and therefore the more cautious is the response of the central bank to exoge-
nous disturbances. Furthermore, the extent of the adjustment of the policy instrument is
conditioned by  and x: the higher are the values of  and x, the coe¢ cients associ-
ated to the target variables, the faster the economy returns to its equilibrium values when
some shocks occurr. Finally it is assumed that "mt is an i.i.d shock term.
4.3 Dynamics with hiring costs and sticky prices
The model presented so far, although featuring several market imperfections and institu-
tional parameters, can be reduced to a relatively simple three equations macro-model as
can be done with the standard NK model. The equilibrium in our economy with hiring
costs, Nash bargaining and equilibrium unemployment is fully characterised by the Euler
equation (the IS curve), the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), the monetary policy
rule and the processes for the exogenous shocks:
IS: x^t =   1

(it   Ett+1   rt) + Etx^t+1 (51)
NKPC: ^t = Et f^t+1g+  fF1x^t   F2x^t 1   F3Etx^t+1   F4a^t +W"^tg (52)
Taylor rule: {^t = m{^t 1 +  (1  m)Et(^t+1) + x (1  m) x^t + "mt (53)
Exogenous processes:
Productivity shock: at = aat 1 + uat
Wage Shock: "t = w"t 1 + u"t
Monetary Policy Shock: "mt = u
m
t
The model here presented may be compared with a standard New Keynesian model
where structural imperfections in the labour market are absent. We also perform a sensitiv-
ity analysis in order to explore how the economy responds to shocks as some fundamental
parameters change. The model presented allows one to pursue the analysis of the di¤er-
ences in dynamic performance between two economies, characterised by di¤erent degrees
of market imperfection and labour protection. All such exercises are performed in section
6.
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5 Calibration
In this section we describe the parameter values used in our baseline calibration. These
parameters are chosen to be largely consistent with those standard in the New Keynesian
literature. The following table summarises the baseline values for the key parameters of
our model with hiring costs:
Preferences and Technology     A
0:99 2 11 1:1 1
Labour market u G   b
0:08 0:26 0:08 0:5 0:865
Price nominal rigidity 
0:75
Interest Rate rule m  x
0:9 1:1 0
ShocksPersistence w a "
0:75 0:9 0
Preferences and technology :  is set equal to 0:99, which implies a riskless annual
return of about 4 percent (The time period is taken to correspond to a quarter). We
assume  = 2, which implies a greater degree of risk aversion than that implied by a log
utility function. The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods  is set equal
to 11, corresponding to a markup  = 1:119. The steady state level of productivity A is
set equal to 1 only for simplicity.
The labour market : In the baseline calibration, we set u = 0:08, which is roughly
consistent with the average unemployment rate in Europe (EU15). Following Trigari
(2005), we assume a separation rate  equal to 0:08. This value is consistent with the
ndings in Hall (1995), that is a separation rate between 8 and 10 percent. The relative
bargaining power  is set to 0:5, which implies that the bargaining power of workers is 1/2
of the bargaining power of rms. The scaling parameter G is chosen such that hiring costs
are 1% of steady state output20. The remaining labour market parameters are determined
by using steady state relationships. In particular, the job-nding rate HU = 0:481. Finally,
the steady state equilibrium condition allows us to pin down the value of home production
b.
The degree of price rigidity  is set equal to 0:75, as in Galí (2002), implying an average
duration of a price contract of one year (a higher level than suggested in Galí and Gertler,
1999 for the U.S. economy).
Following Walsh (2005), we adopt a baseline interest rate rule for monetary policy
where the central bank is assumed to respond to ination but not to the output gap
(x = 0). Furthermore, we assume that the degree of inertia in the policy rule m equals
0:9, a value consistent with the empirical evidence on policy rules. In subsection 6.3 we
19Notice that a mark-up of 1.1 is denitely lower than the average (1970-1992) mark-up in manifacturing
estimated for several OECD countries by Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, Pilat (1996).
20Walsh (2005) makes a similar assumption when he calibrates job posting costs to be 1% of steady-state
output.
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shall also explore the consequences of variations in the parameters of such a monetary
policy rule.
Persistence of shocks: we assume that productivity shocks are more persistent than
wage shocks (a = 0:9 while w = 0:75).
In the following, we compare our model with hiring costs with a standard New Key-
nesian model. Notice that, for an easier comparison, we use exactly the same parameter
values for the two models. The only parameter that enters into the standard NK model,
but is absent in our model, is the inverse of the elasticity of labour supply, , which we
set equal to 1, implying a unit wage elasticity of labour supply (as in Galí, 2002).
6 Simulations
As already mentioned, the standard NK model fails in replicating the large and persis-
tent response of output and to reproduce the sticky dynamics of ination after nominal
shocks. Moreover, the standard NK model typically implies that the volatility of ination
is much larger than the one of output, a result which again is at odds with empirical
evidence. In this section we show that our simple model with hiring costs and equilibrium
unemployment helps to solve these shortcomings.
6.1 Comparison with the standard NK model
First of all, it is relevant to evaluate the impact of a monetary shock, which in our simu-
lation takes the form of a 1% decrease in the nominal interest rate. The results obtained
are shown in Figure 2.
Several interesting facts emerge. First, ination in an economy with hiring costs (sim-
ply labelled as h) appears to be less volatile and more persistent than in a standard NK
economy (denoted as s). Second, the response of output shows higher persistence in a
h-economy than in a s-economy. Therefore, the model with hiring costs is able to better
replicate a central dynamic feature of real world economies, namely the sluggish response
of ination together with the large and persistent response of output (Trigari 2005, p.
2). Third, in the h-model the sensitivity of real marginal costs and of real wages to output
changes is much lower than in the standard NK model. Interestingly, the low volatility
of real wages is obtained endogenously, without the need to impose an unexplained real
wage rigidity. This endogenous rigidityof the real wage comes from the fact that, by
assuming a constant reservation wage (the home production b), we have de facto closed the
traditional intertemporal substitution channel of employment variations. In line with em-
pirical evidence, in our model employment uctuations are mainly determined by labour
demand variations.
Our simple model with hiring costs is thus able to overcome many of the dynamic
weaknesses of the standard NK model. Furthermore, it can be shown that these dynamics,
obtained with a simple and tractable model, are very similar to the ones obtained in
those far more complex NK models which incorporate labour search and exogenous wage
rigidities (Trigari, 2005 ; Walsh, 2005).
The intuitive reasons behind the results here obtained are as follows: a positive nominal
shock causes an increase in the aggregate demand for goods and labour. Accordingly,
in period t recruiting activities and unit hiring costs also increase. However, for each
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Figure 2: Comparison with the standard NK model
additional hiring undertaken in this period, there will be (1 ) more employed workers in
the next period21. In this context, additional current hirings generate, in period t+1, two
externalities. On the one hand, the increase in the number of employed workers reduces
the costs of new hires; on the other hand, a lower level of unemployment has a negative
impact since it represents an obstacle to the matching process and thus increases hiring
costs. These two forces may counterbalance one another and as a net e¤ect may produce
not only a less pronounced responsiveness of marginal costs to output uctuations, but
also a smoother dynamic. Furthermore, the less marked change of the marginal value of
an employment relationship (the lower volatility of S), induces, on its turn and for a given
bargaining power , a less pronounced change of the real wage, as shown in Figure 2.
6.2 The Role of Labour Market Institutions
Additional insights may be obtained by comparing the di¤erent output and ination re-
sponses to exogenous shocks and associated to di¤erent values of the structural imperfec-
tions of the labour market. This sensitivity analysis has been performed by varying the
value of the separation rate  (Figure 3), of the workersbargaining power  (Figure 4),
and of the hiring costs G, expressed as a percentage  of aggregate output (Figure 5). We
just show the results obtained following a wage shock, i.e. a 1% unexpected increase of
the real wage. The same conclusions hold with respect to other shocks.
21By simply considering the denition of the marginal hiring costs at time t+1 some relevant intertem-
poral links appear, as St+1 = G
Ht+1
Ut+1
= G
Nt+1 (1 )Nt
1 (1 )Nt .
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis: changing separation rate ( )
Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis: changing bargaining power ( )
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis changing hiring costs as a percentage of aggregate output
()
It is interesting to note that the larger the departure of each single key parameter
from the value it would assume in a competitive framework, the smaller the response of
aggregate real activity to exogenous shocks. The closer the economy is to a competitive
ideal the more volatile are output responses.
Notice also that, for any set of parameter values, a wage shock generates, through
an increase in marginal costs, higher ination and lower output levels. However, the
magnitude of these e¤ects are signicantly conditioned by labour market institutions,
since employment and wage adjustments are inuenced by the various rules governing
labour allocation.
To evaluate the role of these institutions, one can start by considering the impact of
a wage shock under di¤erent legislation on employment. The shock generates a lower
job destruction, the higher is the employment protection, and therefore the lower is the
separation rate . It means that the contractionary impact on employment and output
of an exogenous wage shock are lower when higher ring costs cause a lower employment
adjustment.
Furthermore, a higher protection of workerspositions may be obtained in wage agree-
ments. A higher workerscontractual strength , due for instance to an increase of union
membership or a higher coverage of collective agreements, makes that a wage shock feeds
into lower contraction of employment and output.
Similar results are obtained when the insidersposition is empowered by the presence
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of higher rents, due to a higher level of recruitment costs ; in this case the matching
rents are increased by recruitment costs, and these costs as well as ring costs, reduce job
turnover rates, hence a given wage shock gives rise to lower job destruction.
6.3 Rigid versus exible economy
To further explore the role played by the several imperfections and by their combined
action, it is possible to compare the simulated dynamic behaviour of two di¤erent model
economies, one featuring signicant imperfections in the labour market, and the other one
showing a more competitive framework. Let us call the rst one the Rigid Economy (RE),
and the second one the Flexible Economy (FE). This simplied characterisation is obtained
by introducing in the RE high recruitment costs, a lower separation rate and a higher
workers bargaining power. The following table summarises the main characteristics of
the two economies22:
Separation rate Workers Bargain ing Power H iring Costs (as % GDP) Unemploym ent Rate
R igid Economy 0:06 0:7 1:5 0:10
Flexib le Economy 0:10 0:3 0:8 0:04
The assumed parametrisation for the two economies has been used to evaluate the
impact of exogenous shocks in the two di¤erent scenarios. It is natural to observe that
the inuence of monetary policy, which can be advocated when some disturbance hits the
economy, is conditioned by the objective trade o¤ shown by the slope of the Phillips curve.
Let us assume, for instance, some exogenous adverse shocks that shift up the Phillips curve.
For the same set of central banks preferences in terms of ination and output deviations,
one obtains that disination is costly in terms of output losses, the atter is the Phillips
curve. This comes true for the FE, where the task of bringing down ination produces a
more signicant sacrice in terms of output contraction23.
The results in terms of responses to a wage shock for the RE and for the FE are
obtained under the hypothesis of a standard Taylor rule characterised by a persistence
parameter m = 0:9, an ination weight  = 1:5 and an output gap weight x = 0:5.
To maintain comparability, the same rule has been assumed for the two economies. The
results are shown in Figure 6.
Observe from the patterns shown in Figure 7 that a less pronounced uctuation of
22Others parameters are obtained through the steady state conditions. In particular, under these cali-
brations we get:
- Job-Finding rate H
U
: 0:35 for the RE, 0:71 for the FE
- Recruitment costs G: 0:71 for the RE, 0:11 for the FE
- Reservation Wage b: 0:822 for the RE, 0:883 for the FE.
23Assume that exogenous shocks are zero and suppose also that the monetary authority tries to perma-
nently rise the employment level by x%. It follows that this policy leads to a steady state level of ination
given by ^ = 1
1  (F1   F2   F3)x. For the same degree of nominal stickiness, the RE is characterised
by a steeper Phillips curve, since high recruitment costs G, strong trade unions (high ), strong employ-
ment protection (a small separation rate ) generate a coe¢ cient 1
1  (F1   F2   F3) higher than that of
the FE. For instance, for the parametrisation chosen and presented in this section the slope of the Phillips
curve of the RE is nearly three times higher than that of the FE.
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Figure 6: Rigid vs exible economy: wage shock with a traditional Taylor rule
Figure 7: Rigid vs exible economy: wage shock with an anti-ination oriented Taylor rule
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Figure 8: Rigid vs exible economy: an unexpected policy shock (anti-ination Taylor rule)
output is obtained in a more rigid context, since in this case, the same ination target
calls a lower volatility of output, as predicted by its steeper Phillips curve. The di¤erences
are even more signicant when the monetary authority is anti-ination oriented and adopts
a policy more oriented to a strict ination targeting. By imposing x = 0: and  = 1:1,
the results obtained are shown in Figure 7.
The comparison seems appropriate to interpret the di¤erent scenario observed in the
US and the Euro area, where the two central banks adopt similar policy rules to stabilise
ination, but face di¤erent side-e¤ects in terms of output stabilisation, as proved by the
lower volatility of the output gap prevailing in several European countries.
To further evaluate the di¤erent responses of output and ination to exogenous shocks,
let us consider an unexpected policy shock represented by a one percent decrease of the
nominal interest rate (Figure 8). As one can see from Figure 8, the impact of the same
monetary policy shock is inuenced by the several institutions governing the functioning of
the labour market. When employment protection, workers bargaining power and matching
rents due to recruitment costs are higher, as in the RE, a given policy shock and the
consequential aggregate demand expansion exert stronger upward pressures on wages,
marginal costs and ination. However, for a given nominal shock, the higher ination
response in the RE is associated with dampened uctuations of employment and output,
thus showing that the labour market represents a crucial channel for the transmission of
monetary policy. This implies that, for given central banks preferences, the RE shows
much lower volatility of output and a higher volatility of ination, thus suggesting that
the same stabilisation target calls for di¤erent policy rules in the two economies.
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As for productivity shocks, as seen in subsection 4.1, a positive shock causes a reduction
of cmct, the log deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state value. This e¤ect in
turns generates an initial lower price dynamics ^t. The magnitude of this impact is
conditioned, as seen from the Phillips curve, by several parameters that play a role in
determining the link between marginal costs and current ination, and therefore on F4,
where F4 = 1 + (1  )S (1 + H 0) (1  a).
A careful examination of F4 shows that the labour market imperfections positively
a¤ect F4, and therefore the more relevant the imperfections in the labour market the
higher F4. The intuition behind this result is that a positive productivity shock allows
rms to produce a given level of output with less workers and this labour saving e¤ect
is higher when recruiting and ring costs are higher and when employees are able to
appropriate a larger share of matching rents. These considerations may explain why the
initial reduction of ination is signicantly higher in the RE than in the FE. However, this
initial impact tends to vanish in the long run, as shown in Figure 9, since in our model the
dynamic pattern of marginal costs implies that a lower recruiting e¤ort at time t increases
the cost of hiring new workers in period t + 1 (equation 44). These dynamic e¤ects can
easily motivate the reversal patterns that a disination have in the two economies, thus
justifying why the di¤erentials in price reduction obtained in the rst period in the RE,
are reabsorbed in a longer perspective.
It must be added that when positive shocks lead to a higher natural output, stickiness
in price setting does not produce the same increase of the actual output. In the rigid
economy, however, the higher real rigidities featuring this economy are conducive to a lower
distance between the actual and the natural output and generate a protracted response of
output gap, as shown in Figure 9.
Figure 10 reports some of the volatilities of output and ination resulting from di¤erent
kinds of shocks. The interesting result, once again, is that labour market institutions and
imperfections deeply a¤ect the constraints faced by the central bank. A country that has
more rigid labour markets typically experiences a lower degree of output volatility and
higher ination volatility. Intuitively, when labour markets are rigid, it is more costly for
the rm to hire new workers and therefore employment does not vary as much as it would
in a more exible economy. If the rigidity lies in the labour market, in the RE job and
output ows are less volatile, as quantities cannot adjust and the shock has to be absorbed
through price changes.
7 Conclusions
We have constructed a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to study the interactions
between market imperfections and nominal rigidities which is capable of overcoming the
main shortcomings of the standard NK model.
In order to get involuntary unemployment and a more sensible dynamics than that
obtained by the standard NK model we only need two ingredients: staggered price setting
and labour market imperfections. The unexplained real wage rigidity indispensable in
Blanchard, Galí (2006) needs not be used in our framework: a certain degree of real wage
stickiness turns out endogenously. Nor there is any need to embody a full-edged search
model of the labour market in the dynamic NK framework.
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Figure 9: Rigid vs exible economy: productivity shock (anti-ination Taylor rule)
Wage Productivity Mon. Policy All
Rigid Economy
Inflation volatility 0,27 1,31 0,82 1,57
Output volatility 0,28 1,33 1,48 2,01
Flexible Economy
Inflation volatility 0,36 1,12 0,30 1,23
Output volatility 0,45 1,70 1,61 2,39
NB: Standard Deviations Shocks:
Monetary Policy 0,002
Productivity 0,010
Wage 0,010 No reference value
Interest Rate Rule: Baseline Calibration
Shocks
As in Walsh (2005)
As in Walsh (2005)
Figure 10: Output and ination volatility in a RE and in a FE
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The introduction of a very simple model of hiring costs, drawn from Howitt (1988), is
su¢ cient to make the divine coincidence to disappear and to create a signicant trade-o¤
between output and ination stabilisation, showing that the structure of the labour and
goods markets deeply a¤ects the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Hence our
model is more parsimonious than those developed so far.
Moreover, with respect to the standard NK model, our model allows to better replicate
the observed sluggish response of ination and large and persistent output uctuations
after a monetary policy shock. The model is also consistent with the observed low volatility
of real wages (as already said, without imposing real wage rigidity) and with a volatility
of output larger than that of ination. The careful reader may realise that the simulated
dynamics of our model are very similar to the ones obtained by using far more complex
models incorporating labour search. We regard the ability of reaching an equally realistic
result with a simpler model as an advantage of our approach.
The model also allows to compare the dynamic behaviour of a rigidand a exible
economy. It turns out that output is less volatile in a rigid economy (i.e. an economy
with a high degree of labour market imperfections) than in a exible economy, whilst the
opposite holds as far as ination is concerned.
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